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1. Introduction 
 
This paper can be considered as a stock-taking exercise that brings together the 
existing findings on the potential costs and benefits of EU membership for both 
Turkey and the EU. Given that the EU-Turkey customs union has been in place since 
1996, it will focus mainly on post-customs-union issues that would affect both parties. 
As far as Turkey is concerned, we focus on the economic impacts of EU membership 
that are likely to result from compliance with the so-called EU conditionality. 
Because EU conditionality requires compliance with the acquis communautaires and 
the Copenhagen criteria, EU membership is likely to have significant effects on the 
Turkish economy mainly through 3 channels: (i) further market integration in the 
context of the Single Market; (ii) change in the macro-economic policy framework; 
and (iii) change in the economic governance structures. On the other hand, Turkish 
membership will affect the EU mainly through 2 channels: budgetary contributions 
and migration.  
 
For Turkey, the costs of EU membership would arise from structural adjustment and 
the adoption of EU policies/standards that may or may not be optimal. The benefits, 
on the other hand, may arise from the adoption of a rule-based economic policy 
framework, further market integration, and net receipts from the EU budget. We 
examine evidence from Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland to ascertain the 
effect of membership on Turkey. We also examine the budgetary and migration 
effects of Turkish membership on the EU. Overall, we suggest that the impact of 
membership is likely to be positive for both parties, but the risks and returns are 
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associated. In other words, Turkey stands to gain more than the EU but it is also the 
party that will be faced with higher adjustment costs.  
 
We first discuss the costs of EU membership for Turkey in section 2. We identify 
three types of cost: (i) the cost of reduced choice for constituents; (ii) the cost of 
reduced policy autonomy for policy makers; and (iii) regulatory costs. We argue that 
these costs can be substantial but we also argue that they must be set against the cost 
of policy failures under the alternative to EU membership. The examination of the 
1990s from this perspective suggests that policy autonomy and/or a wide choice set 
does not necessarily lead to the choice of optimal policies. Therefore, the costs of EU 
membership must be discounted with the cost of sub-optimal policies that may be 
associated with the non-membership option. 
 
Then, we move to the benefits of EU membership in section 3. We argue that EU 
membership is likely to produce better outcomes in terms of economic growth and 
income distribution. We verify this argument by evidence indicating that Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain have achieved better economic outcomes after they had joined the 
EU. The Greek case will be discussed as an exception where performance after EU 
membership was lower than the historical trend. In this section we also demonstrate 
that EU membership will have at least a neutral and probably a positive effect on 
income distribution.  
 
In section 4, we examine the impacts of Turkish accession on the EU. We 
demonstrate that the cost of Turkish accession will be mainly of a budgetary nature. 
The cost due to migration is likely to be very small, but it will be borne by low wage-
earners. Finally, in section 5 we highlight the main findings and draw attention to the 
need for further research. 
 
 
2. The Relative Costs of Discretion and EU Membership 
 
The costs of EU membership can be examined under three headings. First, there are 
costs that emanate from reduced choice for constituents, which EU membership may 
entail for two reasons. On the one hand, membership requires adoption of common 
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policies and standards that are very difficult to change. A candidate country must 
adopt the acquis communautaires and it can hope to change it only if it can secure a 
qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and sufficient support in the European 
Parliament. On the other hand, EU membership may lead to convergence of national 
policies towards the lowest common denominator as a result of competition in the 
single market. True, there are EU rules that set minimum standards in some policy 
areas such as environment, employment protection, health and safety at work, etc. 
However, these standards themselves also reduce the choice set because one size does 
not necessarily fit all. Because of these adverse effects on the choice set, EU 
membership may lead to deterioration in social welfare. 
 
A second category of membership costs may arise from reduced policy autonomy for 
policy makers. Reduced policy autonomy is a result of tying one’s hands with EU 
rules, policies and institutions that may be incongruent either with the preferences of 
the policy makers themselves or with the structural requirements of the national 
economy. To the extent that this is the case, EU membership reduces social welfare as 
policies that may be optimal for the candidate country has to be given up in favour of 
sub-optimal policies required by EU membership.  
 
Finally, EU membership may also be conducive to a higher level of regulatory burden 
in the new member country. EU rules concerning environmental protection, health & 
safety at work, social protection, product safety, competition, etc. may require 
compliance with higher and therefore more costly standards. Such requirements add 
to the regulatory and social costs of production and may lead to an increase in 
unemployment. On the one hand, the higher cost of production induces firms to shed 
labour with a view to reduce average costs. On the other hand, regulatory burden may 
accelerate the failure of relatively less competitive enterprises and thereby lead to 
further increase in unemployment. Unless EU membership generates employment 
opportunities that would match the increase in unemployment, social welfare in the 
new member state will deteriorate as unemployment constitute a deadweight loss.  
 
Both economists and political scientists are aware of these potential costs in the 
context of regional integration in general and European integration in particular. For 
example, students of European integration and Europeanization hypothesize that the 
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cost of adopting EU rules and institutions would increase as the ‘goodness of fit’ 
between the domestic and EU political structures decreases. (Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso, 2000). Another factor that is likely to increase the membership costs is the 
strength of ‘institutional veto points’ that, according to Haverland (2000), are able to 
block policy decisions favouring EU membership. (See also Bulmer and Radaelli, 
2005).  
 
However, analysis based on ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘institutional veto points’ have 
difficulty in explaining the high level of policy reform that candidate countries have 
undertaken during the Mediterranean and Central/Eastern European enlargements. In 
other words, why did countries with a low degree of ‘goodness of fit’ prove willing to 
undertake high levels of convergence reforms as a precondition for EU membership? 
The failure to explain this willingness stems from the fact that the Europeanization 
literature tends to ignore the costs of inefficient rules and institutions that exist before 
accession. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that the range of policies 
and the quality of the institutions that exist before EU membership are optimal for the 
country at large or at least for the majority of the constituents. However, this is an 
unrealistic assumption because it ignores the possibility that policy choices made 
before EU membership may be sub-optimal and that EU membership may be the only 
avenue for escaping the sub-optimal predicament. To the extent that this is the case, 
accession costs must be discounted to reflect the cost of maintaining the status quo as 
an alternative to EU membership.  
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish economic policy framework was driven 
by a symbiotic relationship between discretionary policies and rent-seeking behaviour. 
As a result, Turkey’s macroeconomic performance has deteriorated and the prospect 
of EU membership has become increasingly problematic. (Ugur, 2004).  One 
indicator has been the decline in average growth rates and the increase in the volatility 
of economic growth. As can be seen from Table 1, the average growth rates have 
declined from 4.76% in the 1970s to 3.93% in the 1990s; whereas the coefficient of 
variation has increased from 51% to 137% over the same period. 
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Table 1: Declining Growth Rates and Increasing Volatility in Turkey: 
Decade Averages 
 
Decade 1. Average growth 
(%) 
 
2.  Standard 
deviation 
3. Coefficient of 
variation 
(2 / 1) x 100 
1970-79 4.76 2.43 51% 
1980-89 4.04 2.70 67% 
1990-99 3.93 5.37 137% 
 
(Calculated from GDP data at 1987 prices) 
 
The negative impact of volatility on GDP growth may be more significant than the 
falling growth rates reflected in Table 1. According to a recent work by Hnatkovska 
and Loayza (2005), a one-standard-deviation increase in volatility lowers average per-
capita income growth by 2.2 percentage points. The authors also found that the 
negative association is stronger in countries with weak institutional quality and pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. This finding is supported by cross-country studies reviewed by 
the IMF, which demonstrate that macroeconomic instability (measured as the standard 
deviation of GDP growth rates) is inversely related to institutional quality. According 
to IMF (2003: 104-108), the volatility of GDP growth would fall by approximately 
25% should a country’s institutional quality improve by one standard deviation.  
 
The evidence summarised above suggests that ‘choice’ and ‘policy autonomy’ outside 
the EU had come at a high cost for Turkish citizens: The cost consisted of poor 
institutional quality, fiscal indiscipline, higher volatility/uncertainty, and falling 
growth rates throughout the 1990s. (On institutional quality, see Ugur, 2004. On fiscal 
indiscipline, see World Bank, 2001 and Sayistay 2000). In other words, the 
availability of ‘choice’ and ‘policy autonomy’ does not guarantee that optimal 
policies are chosen and implemented. On the contrary, policy autonomy under a 
defective institutional setup can in fact lead to a combination of discretion and rent-
seeking behaviour, which generates recurrent crises, lower growth rates and worsened 
income distribution.  
 
A rough estimate of the cost of discretion and rent seeking in Turkey can be derived 
from the evidence indicated above. Suppose that Turkey had been able to join the EU 
in 1990 and that membership had led to a one-standard deviation (approximately 16%) 
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improvement in Turkey’s institutional quality. Then, according to IMF (2003), the 
standard deviation of Turkish GDP growth in the 1990s would have been reduced by 
25%. In terms of standard deviation, this is equivalent to 25/16 = 1.56 standard 
deviations. Recall that Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) report that a one-standard 
deviation fall in volatility is conducive to 2.2 percentage point increase in the GDP 
growth rate. Then the GDP growth in Turkey would have increased by (1.56) x (2.2) 
= 3.43 percentage points over and above the actual growth rates recorded in the 1990s.  
Finally, given that population growth in Turkey was 1.83% per year over the 1990s, 
the per-capita income growth would have been 3.43 – 1.83 = 1.60% higher than what 
was the case. Then, over 10 years, the average person in Turkey would have been 
better off by 17.2 %. [Note that the compound extra growth over ten years is given by 
(1 + 0.016)10 = 17.2%].  
 
Therefore, it was not surprising to observe that, towards the end of the 1990s, large 
sections of Turkish society have begun to question the desirability and sustainability 
of the discretionary policy regime. This tendency has reached a zenith with the onset 
of the 2001 financial crisis, which led to a fall of 7.5% in Turkish GDP. The Turkish 
government had to sign a stand-by agreement with the IMF, which provided for a 
credit of US$ 15 billion in return for structural reforms and fiscal tightening. As Onis 
(2005a) has indicated, the strictness of the IMF conditionality after 2001 has not led 
to massive waves of protests against the IMF. Instead, there was a tendency to blame 
the domestic political system for long-standing economic problems that culminated in 
the 2001 crisis. In other words, the Turkish public acted rationally and rejected a 
system of discretion and rent-seeking that had been generating lower growth rates and 
higher volatility. Interestingly, just at the same time, public support for EU 
membership reached its highest level of 74% in November 2001 when the negative 
impact of the crisis was at its highest (Carkoglu, 2004: 23).  
 
These high levels of support were recorded against a background of strong evidence 
that EU membership would imply significant loss of policy autonomy and that the EU 
conditionality had to be spelled out in detail in a National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). In addition, the support for EU membership was 
displayed despite the fact that veto points such as the military and the nationalist-
statist elite were trying to mobilise nationalist support for their anti-EU stance on 
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sensitive issues in EU-Turkey relations – namely the role of the military, the Kurdish 
problem and the Cyprus problem. This evident public support for rule-based policy-
making (including economic policy) has been essential in shaping the electoral 
success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the election of November 
2002.  
 
The analysis above suggests that the cost of EU membership cannot be assessed 
without taking into account the cost of the status quo - i.e., the cost of remaining 
outside the EU. While outside the EU, the Turkish economy experienced falling 
growth rates, increased macroeconomic instability, and high levels of inflation that 
averaged at about 60% per year. As a result, the income gap between Turkey and the 
EU average has widened, income inequality within Turkey has increased, and Turkish 
politics has become more unstable, leading to government tenure of 1 year on average 
in the 1990s. These are significant costs that must be compared with the cost of 
reduced choice and reduced policy autonomy of EU membership. Such comparison 
cannot be undertaken on the basis of hard evidence because the cost of reduced choice 
and reduced policy autonomy cannot be quantified.  
 
Nevertheless, a qualitative assessment is possible. A qualitative assessment suggests 
that structural differences between the Turkey and the EU would increase the cost of 
required policy reform. However, it is also true that a credible prospect for EU 
membership itself reduce the costs of policy reform. When EU membership emerges 
as a government policy, the economic and political actors likely to be affected will 
adjust their future expectations accordingly. If the prospect is credible, economic and 
political actors in favour of EU membership will increase their support to the 
incumbent government. On the other hand, actors opposed to EU membership will 
realise that their campaigns against EU membership are now less likely to induce the 
government to change its mind. Faced with this reduced chance of success, actors 
opposed to EU membership will begin to take measures that will reduce their 
adjustment costs rather than maintain a fight that they are less likely to win. As a 
result of stronger support from pro-membership actors and weaker resistance from 
anti-membership actors, the government will be able to carry out policy reforms at 
lower costs.  
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Such an outcome would depend crucially on two factors: (i) the extent to which the 
government perceives EU membership as an indispensable policy goal; and (ii) the 
extent to which the EU is committed to take the reforming country in. In the past, the 
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish governments as well as the governments of Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have perceived EU membership as an 
anchor that would make the democratisation and transition reforms irreversible. In 
turn, the EU was committed to integrate these countries as a means of reducing the 
security risks that may have arisen from political instability and divergent foreign 
policy orientations in its periphery. Therefore, in the context of previous enlargements, 
prospective EU membership proved to be a credible commitment mechanism. As a 
result, the economic policy frameworks and institutions in these countries have been 
subject to significant and sustained change. (For detailed studies of Europeanization 
in Greece, Portugal and Spain, see Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; for 
Europeanization in CEECs, see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).  Therefore, 
the adjustment cost of EU membership for Turkey can be expected to fall as the 
credibility of Turkey’s membership prospect increases. 
 
3. Economic Benefits of EU Membership: Lessons from Earlier Enlargements  
 
In sections 2 above, we analysed the reasons as to why the costs associated with EU 
membership may not be as high as usually assumed. In this section, we examine some 
evidence suggesting that tying one’s hands under the acquis communautaires may 
produce economic benefits.  
 
The traditional literature on the impact of regional integration focused on the trade-
creation and trade-diversion effects, using comparative static methods of calculation. 
The pioneering study by Viner (1950) concluded that regional integration would lead 
to an increase in wlefare if the trade-creating effect dominates the trade-diversion 
effect. Empirical studies on the European Union found out that the welfare effect of 
the EU-wide customs union would be small – usually less than 1% of the benchmark 
GDP. (for a review of the early empirical findings, see Balassa, 1975). Studies of the 
EU-Turkey customs union obtained similar results: the welfare gain from the customs 
union would be betwee 0.5 – 1.5 % of the benchmark GDP, depending on the 
accompanying tax reforms and other structural reforms. (Harrison et al, 1996). 
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These findings suggest that the gains from regional integartion are likely to be small 
and conditional on a number of reforms. Therefore, they raise the question as to why 
countries choose to join regional blocs and why regional blocs have proliferated in 
the 1990s. To explain this conundrum, a new generation of reserach on regional 
integration suggests that there may be additional effects of regional integration that 
are not captured in the traditional approach. One of these effects – the dynamic effect 
of integration over time - has been noted by earlier studies but it was considered as 
too uncertain to be taken seriously. R. Baldwin attempted to capture this effect by 
examining the effect of static gains on investment and future growth. In that widely-
discussed paper, Baldwin (1992) demonstrates that the static gains from integartion 
will act like a positive shock to the capital stock – leading to higher growth rates in 
the future. Although this was an innovative method of trying to capture the dynamic 
effect, it overlooks other likely effects of the single market on economic growth.  
 
Fernandez (1997) attempts to identify what he describes as non-traditional gains from 
regional integration. Among those, two are particularly relevant to Turkey’s 
integration in the EU: signalling and policy credibility. In this context, signalling is 
essentially a method of overcoming the negative impact of the imperfect information 
that investors (foreign and domestic) may have about the domestic economy. By 
entering a regional bloc, the government signals to investors that the economy is 
resolute enough to cope with competitive pressure in a customs union (or a single 
market in EU case). Policy credibility, on the other hand, refers to government 
attempts to overcome the time-inconsistency problem by importing the trade policy 
(and other economic policies in the EU case) of the regional bloc. Fernandez suggests 
that both signalling and policy credibility may have positive effects on the rates of 
investment and growth. 
 
We think that this perspective may be quite relevant for explaining why relatively less 
developed countries (e.g., Ireland in the 1970s; Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 
1980s; CEECs in the 1990s; and Turkey in the current round) may be interested in 
joining a regional bloc established by more developed countries. Fernandez’s analysis 
would suggest that these countries, after joining the EU, will outperform their 
historical trends in terms of economic growth. This will be due to higher levels of 
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foreign investment (the signalling effect), higher levels of efficiency (policy 
credibility effect), and less risk of policy failures (policy credibility effect). As can be 
seen, these expected benefits of regional integration overlap with the benefits of 
Europeanization referred to earlier. In other words, by transforming the policy 
framework and the quality of the information about that framework, Europeanization 
can lead to economic benefits. We test this argument by reviewing some evidence on 
the growth performance of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain before and after their 
accession to the EU. 
 
Table 2: Per-Capita Income Growth: 
10 Years Before and After EU Membership  (%) 
(EU-15 in brackets) 
 
 
 
 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
Greece 
Membership 
Date 
 
1973 
1986 
1986 
 
1981 
Decade before 
Membership 
 
3.7 (3.9) 
2.0  (2.0) 
0.8  (2.0) 
 
3.6  (2.5) 
Decade after 
Membership 
 
2.4  (1.6) 
3.6  (1.9) 
2.7  (1.9) 
 
0.7  (2.3) 
 
(Source: ABN-AMRO, 2004: 13) 
 
Table 2 shows that Portugal and Spain have outperformed not only their historical 
trends, but also the EU-15 trend. Compared to the pre-accession decade, Portugal’s 
per-capita income grew 1.6% and that of Spain grew 1.9% faster each year. This 
means that, over 10 years, the Portuguese and Spanish per-capita income was 17.2% 
and 20.71% higher that what would have been if the countries had remained outside 
the EU. After membership, the per-capita income of these countries grew faster than 
the EU-15 too. As a result, the income gap between Portugal and EU-15 narrowed by 
18.3% and that between Spain and EU-15 by 8.3%. In the case of Ireland, there was a 
small slow down in the per-capita income growth rate after accession, but because the 
Irish per-capita income still grew faster than the EU, the per-capita income gap 
narrowed by 8.3% too. When we look at Greek performance, we see deterioration not 
only relative to the historical trend but also relative to the EU. As a result, the average 
Greek person suffered deterioration both in historical terms and in terms of the 
income gap with the EU-15. 
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It is interesting to observe that there was a similar trend with respect to employment 
performance too (Table 3). Ireland, Portugal and Spain appear to have reversed the 
negative employment growth recorded before EU membership into modest positive 
growth after membership. In addition, employment creation in these countries was 
higher than EU-15. It is important to indicate here that the gain in employment 
creation has occurred despite the negative impact of the structural adjustment that 
these countries had to undergo after membership. In contrast, the Greek performance 
in terms of employment creation mirrored the performance of per-capita income: 
Greece suffered from deterioration not only in historical terms but also relative to EU-
15.  
 
Table 3: Employment Growth: 
10 Years Before and After EU Membership  (%) 
(EU-15 in brackets) 
 
 
 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
Greece 
 
Membership 
Date 
 
1973 
1986 
1986 
 
1981 
Decade before 
Membership 
 
-0.1 (0.3) 
-0.1  (0.1) 
-1.5  (0.1) 
 
0.7  (0.4) 
Decade after 
Membership 
 
0.5  (0.0) 
0.7  (0.5) 
1.6 (0.5) 
 
0.3  (0.8) 
(Source: ABN-AMRO, 2004: 14) 
 
For Turkey, the ABN-AMRO report estimates an annual GDP growth of 4.9% from 
2004-2013, and 5% from 2014-2024 (after Turkey is expected to join the EU). These 
growth rates are higher than the historical trend reflected in Table 1 (which were on a 
falling trend from 4.76% in 1970s to 3.93% in 1990s) and much higher than the 
estimated 2% growth rate for EU GDP. Obviously, the usual caveats apply to these 
figures. First, the estimated growth rate might not be achieved due to unforeseen 
developments in the world economy or because some of the underlying assumptions 
might not hold. Secondly, the Greek case suggests that EU membership may not 
necessarily yield the expected benefits. Finally, the EU may fail to digest the 
enlargement towards the CEECs and/or Turkey – imposing a negative effect on 
Turkey’s growth potential. Nevertheless, one can still derive an unqualified 
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conclusion from the existing evidence: EU membership delivers relatively better 
outcomes when the external environment and EU policy are controlled for.  
 
That the Greek case was an exception, however, raises the question as to whether all 
new members are likely to benefit from the signalling and credibility effects of EU 
membership. This question can be answered only partially. The existing literature 
suggests that the extent of transformation in Greece has remained highly limited and 
unstable between 1981 (the accession date) and mid-1990s. This was partly due to the 
fact that EU conditionality at the time was much less strict and political 
considerations (anchoring the new democracy) have led the EU Council to take a 
lenient approach towards Greece’s pre-accession convergence. However, the main 
reason has been the persistence of clientelism and the discretionary economic policy 
framework associated with it. (See, Ioakimidis, 2001; Patsouratis, 1993; and 
Sotiropoulos, 1995). Under these conditions, consecutive Greek governments 
remained caught in what Allison and Nikolaidis (1997) describe as the Greek paradox 
of inflated promises and poor performance. The implication for Turkey is obvious: 
the expected benefits of EU membership will materialize only if reforms are 
implemented in practice and that they constitute a starting point for continued 
transformation. 
 
Although the evidence examined above tends to indicate a positive effect of EU 
membership on growth, there have always been concerns about negative effects on 
income distribution. These concerns are based on the observation that the EU is 
essentially a project in market integration. Given that market integration may be more 
favourable for better-endowed economic agents, EU membership may lead to a 
worsening of income distribution. We can test the relevance of this argument by 
examining the income distribution trends in the group of countries examined above. 
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Table 4: Indicators of Income Inequality: Gini Indexa 
 Early 1980s Mid-1980s Early 1990s Mid-1990s Year 2003 
Greece 36.6 36.1 32.6 34.5 35.0 
Ireland 
1973 = 37.2 
36.6 38.8 36.8 30.9 31.0 
Portugal 35.7b 34.8b,c 34.7d 36.8d 38.0d  
Spain 35.6 25,9 34.5 35.2 30.3 
Turkey 48.5 44.0 n.a. 45.7 45.0 
Notes: 
a: Figures for years nearest to the beginning, middle and end of decade, except 2000. Simple averages, 
when more than one Gini indices are given for a year. 
b: Continental Portugal only. 
c: From TUSIAD (2000: 119) 
d: Including overseas territories. 
(Source: UNU/WIDER Database) 
 
 
One conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4 is that income inequality has fallen 
substantially in Ireland and Spain after these countries joined the European Union. 
The other conclusion is that the decline in income inequality has been negligible in 
Greece whereas income inequality in Portugal has increased after EU membership. 
These trends do not allow us to claim that EU accession has led to a decrease in 
income inequality across all members. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
income inequality in all EU members lower than income inequality in Turkey at the 
end of the comparison period. In 2003, income inequality in Turkey was 
approximately 28.5% higher than the income inequality in Greece, 45% higher than 
income inequality in Ireland, and 50% higher than income inequality in Spain. 
Income inequality in Turkey was even higher by 18% than Portugal, including 
overseas territories.  
 
In addition, there is strong evidence suggesting that taxation and transfer policies in 
Turkey have had a minimal effect in reducing the pre-tax, pre-transfer levels of 
income inequality. Whereas distribution policies in core EU member states tended to 
reduce income inequality by 32-52 percent in mid-1990s; in Turkey the effect was 
limited to 5.7% only. This finding is based on comparison over long periods of 10-20 
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years, and not a single-shot comparison over a particular year. (TUSIAD, 2000: 118-
126).  
 
Against this background, we would argue that EU membership is likely to reduce 
income inequality in Turkey for a number of reasons. First, under EU competition 
policy rules, the government’s ability to provide subsidies to exporters and firms in 
strategic sectors will be curtailed or overturned.  Therefore, there will be scope for 
redistribution towards low-income groups. Secondly, EU membership will involve 
redistribution through structural funds and the common agricultural policy (CAP) 
funds – both of which may benefit low-income groups. Third, EU membership will 
either improve social protection or ensure better implementation of the existing 
Turkish legislation in this area. Finally, Europeanization will have a demonstration 
effect, enabling lower-income groups to strengthen their demands for a fair share of 
the income. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe that 71% of the Turkish 
respondents to a recent Eurobarometer survey considered EU membership to be a 
‘good thing’ in 2004 (Eurobarometer, 2004: 4).  
 
4. Impact of Turkish Membership on the EU 
 
The economic impact of Turkish accession on the EU is likely to be small for three 
reasons. First, EU imports from Turkey account only for about 3% of total EU 
imports. Secondly, about 70 percent of Turkish agricultural exports already enter the 
EU without tariffs or quantitative restrictions. Therefore, Turkish membership will 
not imply a significant shock to the EU economy through the trade channel. Third, 
Turkish accession does not affect the existing economic policy framework in the EU. 
Nevertheless, Turkish accession will have some distributional effects on the EU 
through two channels: the EU budget and migration from Turkey. In this section, we 
will elaborate on these distributional effects and the factors that may reduce their 
significance. 
 
It is quite difficult to estimate the net budgetary implications of for a number of 
reasons. First, the amount of net budgetary transfers will depend on the future shape 
of the CAP, the rules governing the distribution of structural support, and the rules 
governing the member states’ contributions to the EU budget. Secondly, the amount 
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of agricultural and structural support to be received by Turkey will depend on the 
change in the structure of the Turkish economy. EU transfers will decline as regional 
disparity and the share of the Turkish agriculture in total output decline. Finally, the 
amount of Turkey’s contributions to the EU budget will not be known until the EU’s 
financial perspective for the post-2014 period is in place.  
 
Given these sources of uncertainty, it may be better to begin with the simplest 
scenario in which we assume Turkey joins the EU in 2015 and the rules of the game 
remain the same. Under this scenario, Turkey would contribute to the EU a budget an 
amount equal to 1.2 per cent of its GDP, which is assumed to be 4 per cent of EU 
GDP in 2015. Under this assumption, Turkey’s budgetary contribution would be 
equal to 0.012 x 0.04 = 0.048 per cent of EU GDP in 20015. Dervis et al (2004) 
estimate that Turkey’s receipts from the EU budget in this scenario would amount to 
0.25 per cent of EU GDP in the same year. Therefore, net budgetary transfers to 
Turkey would be about 0.20 per cent of EU GDP [0.25 – 0.048 = 0.202]. Given that 
EU GDP in 2003 was Euro 9,716 billion and assuming that EU GDP would increase 
by 2 per cent per year until 2015, then the net budgetary transfers can be calculated as 
follows: 0.002x[9716(1+0.02)12] = 24.6 billion Euros.  
 
It must be indicated that this is an upper limit because it is based on the assumption 
that the rules governing CAP and structural fund support would remain the same. 
However, there are indications that structural fund support will be capped at less than 
one per cent of the recipient country’s GDP in order to take account of the recipient 
country’s absorption capacity. For 2005, the new member states’ absorption capacity 
is estimated to be 0.69 per cent of their GDP. Taken this as a benchmark, the State 
Planning Organisation of Turkey estimates that Turkey’s net budgetary receipts 
would be about Euro 5.9 billion. If the cap is set at one per cent of Turkey’s GDP, the 
corresponding amount is estimated to be Euro 7.8 billion. If the time horizon is 
extended to 2020, net transfers would increase to Euro Euro 10 billion (SPO, 2004: 
33-34). 
 
Another way of estimating the budgetary implications of Turkish accession is to use 
the financial packages that the EU has agreed in the last enlargement. Following such 
an approach, Hughes (2004) estimates that the gross budgetary transfers to Turkey in 
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2015 can be expected to be Euro 10.5 billion. According to SPO (2004), Turkey’s 
budgetary contributions in the same year would be Euro 4.9 billion. Therefore, net 
budgetary transfers to Turkey would be 10.5 – 4.9 = 5.6 billion Euros – which is very 
close to the SPO estimate of Euro 5.9 billion.  
 
The estimates presented above suggest that net budgetary transfers to Turkey could 
range between 5.6 – 24.6 billion Euros per year. This sum is a significant amount, but 
relative to EU GDP it represents a very small percentage, which is between 0.05 – 0.2 
per cent. In addition, the net budget transfers to Turkey are more or less equal to the 
total budgetary transfers to the 10 new members. Therefore, there is no a priori 
economic reason to suggest that the budgetary cost of Turkish accession is not 
manageable. There is however a political issue here as the budgetary cost of 
integrating one country (Turkey) is equal to the budgetary cost of integrating ten 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
However, there may be a positive effect on EU fiscal balances as a result of Turkish 
migration. In a comprehensive survey, Krieger (2004) establishes that potential 
migrants from Turkey are better educated than those from Central and Eastern 
European members and tend to be drawn from the 15 - 39 year age bracket.  Brücker 
(2002: 27) reports that net tax payments (i.e., the balance between tax payments and 
social security transfers plus government expenditures) by migrants are positive over 
the life cycle if immigrants’ age is between 11 - 48 years. The net contribution of a 
representative immigrant over the life cycle is around Euro 50,000. These findings are 
parallel to those of Storesletten (2003), who finds that the net present value of the 
contribution of a young working immigrant to Swedish public finances is US$23,500.  
 
This brings us to another issue with evident political connotations in EU-Turkey 
relations: the impact of Turkey’s accession on migratory flows into the EU. The issue 
occupies the public debate in two ways: (i) the number of Turkish migrants expected 
to move to core EU countries after the introduction of free movement; and (ii) the 
impact of Turkish migrants on wages and employment chances of the incumbent 
labour force.  
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One estimate of migration from Turkey to EU-15 is provided by Lejour et al (2004: 
35-36), who predict that the migration potential (which does not take account of 
return migration) by 2025 is 2.7 million. This is similar to the number of migrants 
estimated to move from Central and Eastern European members to EU-15, which is 
estimated to be 2.9 million. This is equivalent to 0.7 per cent of the EU-15 population 
in the reference year. Another study by Erzan et al (2004). Assuming that free 
movement of labour is granted in 2015, Erzan et al estimate net migration to EU-15 to 
be 1.07 million by 2030. Interestingly, the free movement estimate is lower than a 
hypothetical guest worker regime estimate, which is 1.83 million by the same year. 
When migration data for Turkey and cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
is used, the net Turkish migration is estimated to be 0.96 million in the case of free 
movement scenario and 1.92 million in the case of a guest worker regime similar to 
that implemented by Germany in the 1960s. The highest estimate provided by Erzan 
et al is a net migration of 2.13 million by 2030, on the basis of an ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimation for Turkey only.  
 
Krieger (2004) follows a radically different method for estimating the number of 
migrants from Turkey and Central and Eastern European countries to EU-15. His 
estimate is based on face-to-face interviews with 15,000 people across the focus 
countries. Questions were asked to establish the general intention for migration (the 
‘soft’ indicator of migration to EU-15) and the strong intention for migration (the 
‘hard’ indicator of migration to EU-15). The interview results suggest that the number 
of people willing to migrate from Turkey to EU-15 ranges between 0.4 million 
(strong intention) and 3.03 million (general intention). This estimate suggests that the 
number of people who contemplate to migrate under a free movement scenario may 
be high, but the number of actual migrants is likely to remain small.   
 
We think that this finding is more reliable than the estimates derived from 
econometric models because it reflects the rationality implicit in migration decisions.  
Potential migrants will commit to migrate not only on the basis of push and pull 
factors such as unemployment in the country of origin, wages and employment 
chances in the destination country, etc. They will also take into account other risks 
associated with migration, which can include stigmatization, marginalization, and 
cultural rupture. In fact, the experience of earlier enlargements lends support to this 
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reasoning. The number of migrants from Mediterranean members such as Greece and 
Italy remained lower than what was expected at the time (ILO, 1990). Given past 
experience and the range of estimates reported above, we would argue that the level 
of net migration from Turkey to EU-15 can be expected to vary between 1 – 1.5 
million by 2030. This is hardly an unmanageable flood as it would constitute about 
one-third of one per cent of EU-15 population and about half of one percent of EU-15 
labour force.  
 
Also, there is an extensive range of studies suggesting that the impact of migration on 
wages and employment chances is usually less significant than what is implied by the 
policy debate. In fact, some findings suggest that any adverse effect from migration is 
very likely to be small whereas some others suggest that migration would have a 
positive effect on the labour market. For example, Smolny (1991) reports that 
migration into West Germany had positive employment and output effects, and 
alleviated pressure on wages and inflation. Similarly, Starubhaar and Weber (1994) 
found that this is the case for Switzerland. Finally, ten empirical studies cited by 
Brücker (2002: 20) reflect similar results. Nine out of the ten studies show that ‘… a 
1% increase in the labour force through migration yields a change in native wages in 
a range … between -0.3% and +0.3%.’ These empirical studies also report that 
individual unemployment risks increase in a range between zero and 0.2%.  
 
A report by the European Integration Consortium (2000) provides similar insights into 
the likely consequences of free movement within an enlarged European Union. 
Focusing on Austria and Germany, the Consortium states the following: ‘Against the 
background of empirical knowledge on the labour impact of migration, the projected 
flows and stocks of migrants will affect neither wages nor employment in the host 
countries strongly. … One should recall that an increase of the foreigner share in one 
branch by one percentage point reduced wages by 0.25 per cent in Austria and 0.65 
per cent in Germany. The risk of unemployment is increased by 0.8 per cent in 
Austria and 0.2 per cent in Germany.’  
 
These findings enable us to conclude that the negative effect, if any, of Turkish 
immigration on wages and employment will be very small – much less than 1%. Let 
us bear in mind that  the highest estimates of Turkish migration suggests that the 
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Turkish migrant stock will constitute only 0.7 per cent of EU-15 population, which is 
equivalent to 1.1 per cent of the labour force. If we take a less pessimistic view and 
estimate the number of Turkish migrants at 1.5 million, this will be equivalent to 0.35 
per cent of EU-15 population and 0.6 of EU-15 labour force. Taking the worst 
estimates provided by the European Integration Consortium (2000), the impact of 
Turkish migration would be 0.3 per cent fall in wages and 0.4 per cent increase in the 
unemployment risk. These are very small impacts that can hardly be distinguished 
from zero.  
 
Nevertheless, we must also bear in mind that these risks can be higher for individual 
host-country workers with very low human capital endowment. We should also bear 
in mind the fact that the earning capacity of this minority is already low. Therefore, 
the challenge for EU policy-makers is to find ways for compensating the small 
number of low-skill workers who are likely to be affected by Turkish migration 
without falling hostage to demands for suspending free movement of labour 
indefinitely. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The analysis above enables to conclude that tying one’s hands through EU 
membership may be a superior choice compared to the combination of discretion and 
rent-seeking behaviour that has determined Turkey’s poor economic performance in 
the 1990s. Discretion generates economic instability and delivers lower growth in the 
long run. It also perpetuates or exacerbates existing inequalities as the clientelistic 
groups it rewards are generally those who are already better-off in terms of physical 
or human capital endowment. These costs of discretion and rent seeking have been 
evident in Turkey before EU membership. 
 
Another conclusion that can be derived is that Turkey will be able to secure benefits 
from EU membership, provided that the signalling and policy credibility effects of 
integration are not undermined by political instability and a return to populist 
economic policies after accession. The potential benefits of EU membership will 
include both higher rates of per-capita income growth and possible decline in income 
inequality. The per-capita income growth can be 1.5 – 2.0 percent higher than the 
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rates of growth that would be achieved under a no-EU-membership scenario. On the 
other hand, income inequality can be reduced by 5-10 percentage points on the Gini 
index.  
 
The third conclusion that can be derived from the analysis above is that the benefits 
and costs of EU membership are correlated. The party that is expected to derive high 
levels of benefit is also the party that is expected to bear high adjustments costs (or 
vice versa). The evidence examined above suggests that Turkey is likely to derive 
significant benefits but it is also likely to bear high adjustment costs resulting from 
structural change in the economy and from the adoption of new institutions. The EU, 
on the other hand, is likely to derive smaller economic benefits in return for lower 
risks. The main benefits for the EU will arise from higher returns on capital invested 
in Turkey and the positive effect of young and educated migrants on EU GDP and 
national budgets. The risks faced by the EU are limited to budgetary transfers and 
very small adverse effects on wages and employment chances of workers with low 
human capital endowment. A simple cost-benefit analysis based on these dynamics 
suggests that Turkey’s EU membership is likely to be a positive-sum game for both 
parties. 
 
The final conclusion is a call for caution and further research. Although the estimates 
reported above incorporate all available information, they should in no way be taken 
as certain results because they rely on certain assumptions. In addition, some of the 
estimates are extrapolations, which should be considered as less certain than the 
model predictions on which they are based. Although these shortcomings do not 
necessarily invalidate the direction of the estimated effects, they may well reduce the 
reliability of the reported magnitudes. Therefore, we conclude this chapter by 
indicating that there is an evident need for further research on sectoral, fiscal as well 
as macro-level impacts of Turkey’s EU membership. 
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